Marine Force 2030 - Analyzing the Biggest Changes in Marine Corps Planning Update 2030 Last month's update to the Marine Corps' strategic guidance included many changes to the original document. CSIS's Mark Kancian takes a closer look at what's changed and why it matters.
Marines assigned to Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 11 conduct advanced interdiction team training aboard the fast action destroyer USCGC Robert Goldman (WPC 1142) in the Arabian Gulf. (US Army / Thiem Huynh)
Marine Force 2030
Released in March 2020, Force Design 2030 is a new direction for the Marine Corps and has faced opposition from retired officers. Last month, the Marine Corps released an update to the document with some significant changes. To compare the two documents, CSIS writer Mark Cancian offers the following analysis of what has changed in the past two years and why.
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The Marine Corps' latest update to Force Design 2030 [PDF] comes as the Corps' spiritual civil war reaches full scale. Ignoring critics, the update continues the basic approach of FD 2030, providing reconnaissance and long-range precision strike capabilities to operate in the enemy's war zone and as forces deemed redundant or obsolete. But there are a few areas where the update seems to address critics' concerns.
Gen. David Berger set a new direction for the Marine Corps when he became commandant in 2019. His first commandant's design brief [PDF] covered the concept and some initial changes. In March 2020, details were revealed at the Force Design 2030 event, and CSIS released a detailed analysis of the original plan. The Marine Corps refined this initial design in subsequent articles and reports.
FD 2030 is designed to make the Marine Corps a "small but lethal force" and act as the front line of maritime defense in contested areas. They work with low signatures, are mobile, maintainable and relatively easy to maintain. The consistent mission is to assist the fleet and joint forces in intelligence and counter-intelligence." The implementation of this new vision changed elements that had existed for years, especially the elimination of tanks. fell to the lowest level since the Korean War.
FD 2030 sparked an "intellectual civil war" within the Marine Corps amid criticism from retired officers that Berger's efforts were too focused on the Western Pacific, undermined traditional joint-arms operations, made the Marine Corps too small, and relied too heavily on unproven operations. created. concept. Both sides have been lobbying each other for months.
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It's been about a month since the update, so now it's time for us to understand the biggest changes in the documentation. The changes can be divided into three groups: structure, composition, personnel and policy.
The structure of infantry battalions has always been obvious because these units have always been the core combat organization of the Marine Corps. Plans to reduce the number of infantry battalions from 24 to 21 continue, but the original plan saw each infantry battalion reduced from 896 personnel to 735 personnel, while the update will eventually result in 800 personnel to 835 personnel.
To get the final number, three different structures are tested. However, all emphasize the use of small groups and the integration of long-range precision fire.
All Marine Corps tanks are gone and the update is not going to replace this feature. Continuing this skepticism about armored vehicles, the update refers to the reduction of reconnaissance vehicles, which have been criticized as "too limited".
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This upgrade added two artillery batteries to the final artillery configuration with seven artillery batteries and seven MLRS missile batteries for 21 Infantry Battalion's sustained coastal operations. Additionally, there will be an unspecified number of missile batteries, probably around 14. The reserve has nine batteries, which is unusual for the Marine Corps, where the reserve capacity is weighted toward artillery batteries and does not necessarily mimic active formations.
Retired generals have sharply criticized the artillery move, saying the Marine Corps is moving away from its historically successful combined arms operations. This is an ongoing point of contention, and the construction of the cannon is still a work in progress.
According to the original FD 2030 document, the new unit would include a headquarters, a battalion-sized ground combat element with long-range missile assets, an air defense element and a logistics element. It was seen as the basis for the implementation of a new operational concept in the Western Pacific region. Hawaii's 3rd Marine Regiment has already transitioned to this formation, and two additional regiments, the 4th and 12th Marines, are scheduled to do so as well.
However, the updated document appears to be skeptical. The update stated: "Feedback from Fleet Marine Force exercises has shown that in most cases, operationally organized Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are conducting regular force missions. MLR is part of this larger effort." The question has always been why the Marine Corps needs a new, permanent organization instead of using a traditional approach to mission organization. It is a transition away from MLR structure changes and future conversions. It is unclear whether the doctrine was simply changed or not.
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The update also states, "We focused too much on the lethality of MLR and not enough to experience it." This may signal a structural change in which some parts of the ground combat forces will become intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units. However, the formation of the MLR has significantly reduced the firepower of its already established units (two battalions), so the potential removal of combat power from the MLR is a concern for the retired generals.
Additionally, this update considers whether a reconnaissance or artillery battalion might be a better base than an infantry battalion. This significantly changes the design of the MLR, reducing ground combat capability and further emphasizing fires.
The update includes some future structural reductions to pay for FD 2030 and adjust the Marine Corps to the new vision.
The V-22 fleet will be reduced, but instead of 14 squadrons of 12 aircraft, 16 squadrons of 10 aircraft each are planned, increasing flexibility but losing eight aircraft already in service. 36 planes that have already been cut (mostly). to training camp).
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The Marine Corps plans to dramatically increase its drone capacity, but currently only 18 MQ-9s are programmed. Ultimately, the Marine Corps wants to buy a medium-range long-endurance ship, but that's in the future. The Marine Corps will be far behind the Army (201) and Air Force (351) in armed drone fleets for the foreseeable future.
David Berger, 38th Commandant, US Marine Corps. (US Marine Corps photo by Sergeant Sarah Stegall)
The update reinforces the need for a large amphibious fleet. "No other naval vessel allows for a greater variety of mission packages than amphibious assault ships," it noted. Elsewhere, the Marine Corps reiterated its need for 31 amphibious ships. (Traditionally, this was a limited reserve level to meet the full requirements of 38 large amphibious ships.) However, the original FD 2030 reduced the need for this force, stating that such large warships were too vulnerable to participate in major amphibious assaults. In the future, small amphibious ships with a longer life expectancy will be needed.
As a result, the Pentagon's latest ship plan [PDF] freezes construction of large amphibious assault ships after 2023, reducing the number to 24 over time. Instead, the Navy builds one to three light amphibious assault ships per year, with a total need of about 35. Although the Marines believed that justified the deployment of large amphibious ships in peacetime, this argument was not enough to support the billions. dollar investment. (Would check the full article for a full explanation of the "trash fires" affecting amphibious fleet design today; this is an unresolved issue that may or may not be addressed in a future amphibious fleet study.)
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In the near future, the Marine Corps will experiment with support and charter ships to better understand how small groups are moved from coastal regiments to the western Pacific.
One small change is that the light amphibious warfare program is now called the Landing Ship Medium (LSM). It is not clear what difference the new term is intended to express.
The Marine Corps has published Talent Management 2030 [PDF] as an appendix to the FD 2030 Personnel Policy. The update strengthened some elements and changed others.
Although war games and experiments were a central part of the formation of FD 2030, almost all information was classified. The Marine Corps now plans to release a general summary of its combat performance from November 2022.
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. Criticism from retired generals has prompted the Marine Corps to change the way it interprets some elements of FD 2030. The most significant change is that FD 2030 is defined as current.
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